

# DERIVING BISIMULATIONS BY SIMPLIFYING PARTITIONS

Isabella Mastroeni

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# INTRODUCTION

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
**BISIMULATION:** ... compares systems also on their capability of simulating each others.

**STABILITY:** ... requires a *bisimulation* between a system and one of its abstractions (partitions of states).

**COMPLETENESS:** ... models the precision of an abstract domain wrt an operator.

# INTRODUCTION

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A not bisimilar to C

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

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



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# ABSTRACT INTERPRETATION

Consider the complete lattice  $\langle C, \leq, \wedge, \vee, \perp, \top \rangle$ ,  $A_i \in uco(C)$

Lattice of Abstract Domains  $\equiv$  Lattice  $uco$

$$A \equiv \rho(C)$$

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
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

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# PARTITIONS VS ABSTRACT DOMAINS

Partitions uniquely correspond to particular abstract domains: **PARTITIONING**  
[RT'04, HM'05]




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$$\eta \in uco(\wp(C)) \Rightarrow \forall x, y. x \text{ Rel}^\eta y \text{ iff } \eta(x) = \eta(y)$$




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
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$$R \in Eq(C) \Rightarrow Clo^R(X) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \bigcup_{x \in X} [x]_R$$



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
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⇒  $\Pi(\eta) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Clo^{Rel^\eta} \sqsubseteq \eta$


# COMPLETENESS



BACKWARD COMPLETENESS:  $\eta \circ f \circ \rho = \eta \circ f$




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BACKWARD IN-COMPLETENESS:  $\eta \circ f \circ \rho \geq \eta \circ f$




# COMPLETENESS




*Making* BACKWARD COMPLETE: Refining input domains [GRS'00]

# COMPLETENESS




*Making BACKWARD COMPLETE:* Simplifying output domains [GRS'00]

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
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
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*Making* FORWARD COMPLETE: Refining output domains [GQ'01]

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*Making FORWARD COMPLETE:* Simplifying input domains [GQ'01]



# STABILITY


Let  $S$  and  $R$ , resp., an output and an input partition, let  $p$  be a binary relation:

**STABILITY:**  $S$  is *stable* wrt  $R$  if  $\forall X \in S, Y \in R$  we have  
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
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# MAIN CONTRIBUTION

## WHAT ALREADY EXISTS:

- A correspondence between *stability* and forward completeness [RANZATO & TAPPARO '05];
- A *refinement* algorithm for *partition stability* [PAIGE & TARJAN'87];
- A *refinement* transformer for *abstract domain completeness* [GIACOBAZZI ET AL.'00, GIACOBAZZI & QUINTARELLI'01];
- A *simplification* transformer for *abstract domain completeness* [GIACOBAZZI ET AL.'00, GIACOBAZZI & QUINTARELLI'01];;

# MAIN CONTRIBUTION

## WHAT DOES NOT EXIST:

- A characterization of completeness for partitions;
- A notion of partition stability/completeness for the *backward* direction;
- A *simplification* algorithm for *partition stability*


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
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
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
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
F-COMPLETENESS:  $[f([x]_R)]_S = f([x]_R)$

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**F-STABILITY:**  $X \cap f(Y) \neq \emptyset \Rightarrow X \subseteq f(Y)$  [PT'87,RT'05]



**F-COMPLETENESS:**  $[f([x]_R)]_S = f([x]_R) \Leftrightarrow (\forall X \in Clo_R \Rightarrow f(X) \in Clo_S)$




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**B-STABILITY:**  $X \cap f(Y) \neq \emptyset \Rightarrow f(Y) \subseteq X$

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
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
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


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
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**B-COMPLETENESS:**

$$[f([x]_R)]_S = [f(x)]_S \Leftrightarrow (\forall X \in Clo_S \Rightarrow \max \{ Y \mid f(Y) \subseteq X \} \in Clo_R)$$



# BACKWARD VS FORWARD

- ⇒ A domain is *backward complete* wrt  $f$  iff it is *forward complete* wrt  $f^+ = \lambda X. \bigcup \{ Y \mid f(Y) \subseteq X \}$ ;
- ⇒ A (not trivial) partition is *backward stable* wrt  $f$  iff it is *forward stable* wrt  $f^{-1} = \lambda X. \{ y \mid f(y) \in X \}$ ;
- ⇒ If  $f$  is *injective*, a (not trivial) partition is *forward stable* wrt  $f$  iff it is *backward stable* wrt  $f^{-1}$ ;

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A **backward** problem can always be transformed in a **forward** one, but the viceversa is not always possible!

# REFINING FOR STABILITY: PT GENERALIZED


The best refinement towards **forward stability** always exists!

[PT'87]




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$\mathbb{P}$  : Partition

$\text{PTSplit}_f(S, \mathbb{P}) : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Partition obtained from } \mathbb{P} \text{ by replacing} \\ \text{each block } B \in \mathbb{P} \text{ with } B \cap f(S) \text{ and } B \setminus f(S) \end{array} \right.$

$\text{PTRefiners}_f(\mathbb{P}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ S \mid \mathbb{P} \neq \text{PTSplit}_f(S, \mathbb{P}) \wedge \exists \{B_i\}_i \subseteq \mathbb{P}. S = \bigcup_i B_i \right\}$

$\text{PT-Algorithm}_f : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{while } (\mathbb{P} \text{ is not stable}) \text{ do} \\ \quad \text{choose } S \in \text{PTRefiners}_f(\mathbb{P}); \\ \quad \mathbb{P} := \text{PTSplit}_f(S, \mathbb{P}); \\ \text{endwhile} \end{array} \right. \quad [\text{RT}'05]$

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
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
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
We can use the PT algorithm since a backward problem wrt  $f$  corresponds always to a forward problem wrt  $f^{-1}$ .

# SIMPLIFYING FOR STABILITY

The best simplification towards **backward stability** always exists!


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$$\text{PTSimplifiers}_f(S) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ X \mid X \cap f(S) \neq \emptyset \right\}$$

$$\text{PTMerge}_f(S, P) : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Partition obtained from } P \text{ by replacing} \\ \text{all the blocks } X \in \text{PTSimplifiers}_f(S) \text{ with} \\ \bigcup \text{PTSimplifiers}_f(S) \end{array} \right.$$

$$\text{DPT-Algorithm}_f : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{while } (P \text{ is not stable}) \text{ do} \\ \quad \text{choose } S \in \text{PTSimplifiers}_f(P); \\ \quad P := \text{PTMerge}_f(S, P); \\ \text{endwhile} \end{array} \right.$$

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
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
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
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## EXAMPLE:

Consider  $f(x) = 2x$ .  $\top$  is not stable ( $f(\top) = \text{even} \subset \top$ ).

Consider  $\mathbb{R} = \{\text{even}, \text{odd}\}$  (Parity partition), then

$\text{even} \cap f(\text{odd}) \neq \emptyset$  since  $6 \in f(3)$  and

$\text{even} \not\subseteq f(\text{odd})$  since  $4 \notin f(\text{odd})$

$\Rightarrow$  A forward stable simplification does not exist!

# STABILITY IN ABSTRACT NON INTERFERENCE

ABSTRACT NON INTERFERENCE: [GM'04]

Fixed an observation of public **input**, the variation of private **input** has not to *interfere* with the observation of the public **output**.



$$\forall l_1, l_2 \in \mathbb{V}^L, h_1, h_2 \in \mathbb{V}^H. \eta(l_1) = \eta(l_2) \Rightarrow \rho(\llbracket P \rrbracket(h_1, l_1)^L) = \rho(\llbracket P \rrbracket(h_2, l_2)^L)$$



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Let  $\Upsilon(\eta(l))$  denote the sets of value that has to be indistinguishable by a malicious attacker observing  $\eta$  in input ( $\Upsilon(\eta(l)) = \llbracket P \rrbracket(\mathbb{V}^H, \eta(l))^L$ ).



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
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


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There is interference when:

$$Y \cap \Upsilon(L_1) \neq \emptyset \text{ and } \Upsilon(L_1) \not\subseteq Y$$



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**THEOREM:** The domain  $\left\{ X \mid X \text{ is backward stable wrt } \Upsilon \right\}$  is the strongest harmless attacker for deterministic systems.

# STABILITY FOR OPACITY

**OPAQUE PREDICATE:** A predicate  $\phi$  over the semantics of a system, is opaque wrt the observation function  $obs$  if, for every execution  $t_1$  satisfying  $\phi$  there is an execution  $t_2$  which does not satisfy  $\phi$ , such that  $obs(t_1) = obs(t_2)$ . [Bryans et al. '05]

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**EXAMPLE:**

$\phi = 3|(x^3 - x)$ , attacker capability  $\alpha = \{\mathbb{Z}, 3\mathbb{Z}, \mathbb{Z} \setminus 3\mathbb{Z}, \emptyset\}$

$\Rightarrow$  If the attacker can observe the predicate as the bca of all the function composing  $\phi$  then  $obs(2) \cap \phi = \mathbb{Z} \cap \phi \neq \emptyset$ , while  $obs(2) \not\subseteq \phi$ .



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- $\Rightarrow$  *Completeness* can be exploited for certifying the resilience of opaque predicates to reverse engineering;
- $\Rightarrow$  *Opacity* provides new expectations in seeking domain transformers increasing incompleteness,

# DISCUSSION

- ⇒ We extend the existing notion of stability (corresponding to forward completeness for partitions) also to the backward direction;
- ⇒ We dualize the existing refinement algorithm for stability in order to simplify partitions;
- ⇒ The simplification algorithm can be considered for simplifying abstract models in abstract model checking;
- ⇒ We show fields of computer science where the new stability notion models existing concepts:
  - ✓ The strongest harmless attacker in abstract non-interference [Giacobazzi & Mastroeni '04, Hunt & Mastroeni '05]
  - ✓ Opacity for abstract observations of programs